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1 Introduction
Economists and policymakers generally consider goods and services as two distinct
sectors subject to their own market adjustments, calling for specific policies. Yet,
this is at odds with what we observe for many big firms. Examples include: Apple
selling software and assistance with the utilization of its computers and cell phones,
Toyota providing both cars and loans to consumers buying these cars, Technip supplying
fertilizers as well as technical and financial solutions related to their utilization.
In this paper, we challenge the view that goods and services are two independent
items in the consumer portfolio supplied by firms in separate industries. Thanks to
a unique dataset recording both goods and services exports at the firm-destination
level, we show that the provision of services is associated with higher goods sales. The
effect of services provision on manufacturing goods exports is quantitatively important.
Based on our regression results, which rely on high-dimensional fixed effects and an
IV strategy, it appears that up to 11.8% of overall Belgian manufacturing exports and
up to 22.4% of the manufacturing exports of those firms that export both goods and
services (called hereafter “bi-exporters”) are triggered by services. The increase in sales
is the combination of a price and a quantity effect: when they provide services together
with their goods, bi-exporters set a higher price for their goods and still sell higher
quantities. Note that this is the price of the good alone: the service is subject to a
transaction in its own right in the data; therefore, services act as a demand shifter for
the goods. To rationalize the patterns uncovered in the data, we propose a theoretical
explanation based on one-way complementarity between goods and services (i.e. the
good can be consumed alone or bundled with a service, but the service is never consumed
alone), love for variety, and oligopolistic competition. These three ingredients interact
such that the provision of services increases the perceived quality of the products with
which they come. We finally put our theoretical results in perspective with a series of
alternative rationalizations of our empirical findings.
We believe our results have important implications. First, they suggest that the
frontier between manufacturing and services is blurred. This should affect the way we
think of structural change: the expansion of the service sector is not necessarily at the
expense of manufacturing. Second, they question the way we should define the relevant
markets for competition policy and the design and negotiation of trade agreements.
Specifically, they plead for a unified framework where goods and services are taken
into account together (e.g. Lodefalk, 2015; Heuser and Mattoo, 2017). Finally, our
mechanism is more general than the goods-services case and can be applied to any
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firm’s output that exhibits the same one-way complementarity. One easy example is
represented by the relationship between the iPad and the iPad cover. The identification
and analysis of the one-way complementarity between all the possible pairs of products
are beyond the scope of this paper, but they represent interesting research avenues that
we leave for future work.
The paper is organized into three main parts. In the first one, we use detailed trade
data from the National Bank of Belgium (NBB henceforth) to provide several stylized
facts on bi-exporters. They represent only 8.8% of exporters and the remaining 91.2%
of them are either pure goods exporters (60.1%) or pure services exporters (31.1%).
Despite being only few, they outperform pure goods and services exporters in many
dimensions and they account for about 44.8% of overall goods exports and 42.3% of
services exports. Moreover, bi-exporters almost never export services in destinations in
which they do not offer goods, and they export services in only 26.6% of the destinations
where they export goods. When present, services represent only a small fraction of the
goods export flow. The last two elements reveal an asymmetry in our data in the
relationship between goods and services within the same firm. They suggest that for
bi-exporters, the goods are the main activity of the firms, while services only sometimes
complement goods provision.1 This is corroborated by the observation that in a given
market, bi-exporters export more of a given good than “pure” goods exporters, while
this is the opposite for services export flows. Based on these facts, we focus in the rest
of the paper on firms that export goods and to understand whether services can be a
source of competitiveness for them. When comparing firm-product-destination export
flows that are associated with services to those that are not, we find that services
provision is correlated with higher manufacturing sales; this premium holds when we
control for both firm-product-year and destination-product-year fixed effects, and for a
number of other observable characteristics.
In a second step, we seek an unbiased estimate of the effect of services provision
on firm-level goods export performance. Indeed, despite the presence of multiple con-
trols and fixed effects, it could still be the case that unobserved firm-country specific
factors explain both why firms export services in a given destination and also sell large
quantities of their goods. In this respect, any variable that affects the probability
that a firm exports services to a given destination, without affecting directly its man-
1We do not mean that there are no cases where goods and services are perfect complements and
always traded together. But our data show that as far as exports are concerned, this is not the typical
case we observe. This might be because services remain far less internationally traded than goods. We
come back to the implications of this for our estimations later in the paper.
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ufacturing sales to that destination, offers scope for causal inference about the role of
services on firm-level manufacturing sales. We thus rely on an IV strategy proposed by
Wooldridge (2002) for the case of endogenous dummy variables. Our excluded variable
is constructed as the interaction between a “bundleability” index that measures how
much the HS6-products in the firm’s portfolio can be associated with services, with a
proxy for the easiness of trade in services to a given destination. Considering that our
excluded variable is a combination of a product-specific characteristic and a proxy for
country-specific conditions for services trade, we can reasonably argue that in the pres-
ence of firm-product-year and destination-product-year fixed effects, it is not directly
correlated with firm-product-destination supply or demand shocks. Using this strategy,
we confirm the positive effect of services on goods export performance, and we show
that it results from an increase in both prices (unit values) and quantities.
To rationalize these facts, we develop in the third part a model of oligopolistic
competition where goods and services are one-way essential complements.2 This means
that the service itself does not raise the utility of the consumer unless it is associated
with a good. In this way, the product is essential while the service is optional. A firm
in our model can be seen as a two-product firm whose core product is the good alone
while its peripheral product is a good-service bundle. In the presence of taste for variety,
supplying the bundle naturally raises the demand for the good. This translates into
a larger market share, and thus higher markups over the marginal cost of production
of the good accounting for the price premium of bi-exporters. We also consider direct
extensions of standard models of multi-product firms under monopolistic competition
or oligopoly with and without cost linkages; we discuss as well the possibility that
services are provided locally by affiliates or external suppliers, and the case where
goods and services are two-way complements (i.e. both are essential to the consumer).
While appealing, most of these different modelling strategies can hardly rationalize
some of our empirical findings, in particular the price premium. It is possible however
to rationalize our findings under monopolistic competition when the consumption of
services enters directly as a demand shifter for the goods: this is the case when services
and high-quality varieties are complements and consumers’ willingness to pay increases
with product quality (Manova and Yu, 2017) or when the breadth of a firm’s product
range raises the demand for any of its products (the demand-scope complementarities
assumption in Bernard et al., 2017a).
In the oligopolistic model we propose, by raising both the demand and the price of
2Admittedly, transaction-level data would be ideal to test directly one-way complementarity be-
tween goods and services
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the goods, services provision acts as a demand shifter for the goods; or put differently,
services increase the perceived quality of the good without entering directly as a demand
shifter for it. Our model puts some structure on this intuition by generating a firm-
product-destination demand shifter similar to that in Khandelwal et al. (2013): all else
equal, the perceived quality of a good should be larger when the good comes with a
service. This is indeed what we find in the data: a one standard deviation increase
in the probability of providing services increases the firm-product-destination index
of perceived quality by 20% of a standard deviation for bi-exporters. Therefore, this
paper provides the first econometric evidence that services provision is an important
determinant of the appeal of manufacturing products.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, with the increasing
availability of detailed firm-level data, the theoretical and empirical literature on the
sources of firm success has thrived over the past twenty years. Limiting the scope to
the international trade literature, two main determinants have been emphasized: pro-
ductivity (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003) and quality (e.g. Johnson, 2012;
Crozet et al., 2012). How these differences then translate into heterogeneous markups
has also been discussed in some contributions (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Loecker
and Warzynski, 2012). Hottman et al. (2016) develop a model of multi-product firms
that encompasses all these aspects, and structurally estimate the relative contributions
of these various determinants of firm performance. They find that appeal/quality of
products and product scope account for 80% of the observed variation in overall sales
of US firms. In their model, the products supplied by a firm are imperfect substi-
tutes. In our model, productivity, product appeal, and markups are related through
the combination of one-way complementarity between goods and services, imperfect
substitutability between the good alone and the good provided with the service, and
consumers’ love for variety. By providing services with their goods, more productive
firms increase the demand for their good and can, in turn, increase their markup, which
leads to improving the perceived quality of their products.
Second, considering instead an oligopolistic market structure is motivated by the
fact that, in our data, bi-exporters are found among the largest Belgian exporters. In
this respect, our paper echoes recent empirical and theoretical works that show that
the largest firms in the economy significantly deviate from perfectly or monopolistically
competitive firms in many dimensions. Exchange rate pass-through (Berman et al.,
2012; Amiti et al., 2014), price interactions between firms (Amiti et al., 2019), and
adjustment to trade liberalization (Edmond et al., 2015) are some examples where
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allowing for strategic behavior of firms is important to account for the patterns observed
in the data. Several recent contributions plead to go further in this direction (Bernard
et al., 2018; Neary, 2016; Head and Spencer, 2017). We contribute to this literature by
showing both empirically and theoretically how the range of activities of a firm impacts
its market share and pricing behavior.
The literature on multi-product exporters analyzes the choice of firms to provide
multiple products (e.g. Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Dhingra, 2013;
Nocke and Yeaple, 2014; Mayer et al., 2014; Hottman et al., 2016). In multi-product
firm models under monopolistic competition, it is assumed that the behavior of a firm is
isomorphic to the behavior of a set of single-product firms with different productivities;
therefore, the firms’ decision to add/drop one product in a given market has no impact
on its other products. By contrast, models of oligopoly emphasize demand linkages
within the firm: when products are imperfect substitutes, adding a product tends
to decrease the output of other products. Our model features large firms competing
strategically when consumer demand features one-way complementarity between goods
and services. This mechanism is also in line with Bernard et al. (2017a) who show that
the size of firm-level product scope allows firms to raise their price conditional on the
quantity sold. Besides the common broad interest in understanding how the scope of
economic activities of a firm relates to its economic performance, there are important
differences between our paper and Bernard et al. (2017a). First, they provide a margin
decomposition of firm-level exports and study the heterogeneous relationship between
each margin and firm-level TFP across what they call “carry along” and regular exports;
they also show that export unit values tend to increase with the firm product scope
in a destination. Instead, we investigate how the provision of services is related to the
firms’ manufacturing export values, quantities and prices controlling for a firm’s product
scope. Second, by embedding a demand system featuring one-way complementarity
(Chen and Nalebuff, 2006) in a model of oligopolistic competition, our model generates
a price premium for bi-exporters. Thus, it can be seen as one possible micro-foundation
for the demand-scope spillover assumption in Bernard et al. (2017a) i.e. a positive
relationship between the scope for the items proposed by a firm and the individual
demand for these items.3 Third, we show that this premium is empirically equivalent to
identifying a quality premium: conditional on price, bi-exporters sell higher quantities
of their goods as compared to “pure” goods exporters.
Our paper also relates to the literature on structural transformation and services.
3Eckel and Riezman (2016) study further implications of “carry along” trade.
6
Most of the contributions see this phenomenon from a macro perspective in terms of
sectoral reallocations driven by final demand (e.g. Buera and Kaboski, 2009; Herren-
dorf et al., 2013, 2014). Recent papers instead highlight the within-firm dimension of
structural transformation: firms progressively give up producing goods to increasingly
specialize in services.4 This is the consequence of trade in goods liberalization (Brein-
lich et al., 2018; Pierce and Schott, 2016), firm specialization (Bernard and Fort, 2015;
Bernard et al., 2017b) or offshoring (Berlingieri, 2014). Our paper provides a different
perspective by showing that the production and exports of goods and services can be
complementary, and that combining the two increases the willingness to pay for goods.
Finally, other recent papers are interested in the interplay between good and services.
Using the WIOD database, Miroudot and Cadestin (2017) and Heuser and Mattoo
(2017) analyze the role of services in manufacturing global value chains. Consistent
with our results, Crozet and Milet (2017a) show that French firms in the manufacturing
sector that start selling services increase their profitability and total sales of goods.
Using Belgian data on overall sales, Blanchard et al. (2017) show that the probability
to provide both goods and services is a non-linear function of firm-level productivity.
Since all these studies use balance-sheet data with no information on the destination of
the sales, the analysis in terms of mechanisms is limited. Finally, with the same data
as ours, Ariu et al. (2019) are interested in understanding the gains from purchasing
goods and services from the same origin country as compared to purchasing both items
from two different ones; they consequently focus on firms that import both goods and
services at some point in time. This approach is motivated by a macro perspective on
the quantitative assessment of the gains from trade when both goods and services trade
are liberalized together. Instead, of analyzing the behavior of firms that import goods
and services, we explore the behavior of those that export both. This perspective
is crucial to understand what the gains from providing different items that can be
consumed together, here goods and services, are as compared to providing only goods.
Doing so, we are able to uncover new facts. In particular, our unique dataset allows us
to estimate the sales premium of bi-exporters as compared to “pure” goods exporters
and spell out the possible mechanisms behind it. To do so, we explore margins that
could not be explored in the papers cited above such as unit values; our paper is in
the end the first to highlight the nexus between services provision and goods’ perceived
4Jensen (2011) Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011), Neely et al. (2011), Lodefalk (2013), Kelle (2013),
Ariu (2016b) and Crozet and Milet (2017b) provide a descriptive picture about the involvement of
manufacturing firms in services production and export. Please note that the relation between goods
and services has also been analyzed in the management literature; see for example Cohen and Whang
(1997) and Suarez et al. (2013).
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quality, and to discuss theoretical rationalizations to it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the data and outline
several stylized facts on bi-exporters in section 2. Based on this evidence, we seek
an unbiased estimate of the effect of services provision on the export performance for
goods in section 3. To provide a theoretical basis for our empirical results, we develop in
section 4 an imperfect competition model featuring both consumers’ love for variety and
one-way complementarity between goods and services. Section 5 discusses alternative
explanations for our results, and, finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Data description and stylized facts
We present in this section the data and several stylized facts on the firms that export
both goods and services.
2.1 Data
The data used in this paper comes from three different datasets provided by the National
Bank of Belgium. They contain information on trade in goods (NBB Trade in Goods
dataset), trade in services (NBB Trade in Services dataset) and firms’ balance-sheets
(NBB Business Registers) from 1997 to 2005.
Trade in goods data is organized at the firm-product-destination-year level, and
we have information on the exported values and quantities. Firms are identified by
their VAT number and products are classified following the 6-digit Harmonized System
Nomenclature (HS6). We restrict our analysis to transactions involving a change in
ownership and we discard those referring to movements of stocks, replacement or repair
of goods, processing of goods, returns, and transactions without compensation. Decla-
ration thresholds are applied to collect this data. In particular, firms have to declare to
the NBB any transaction directed to extra-EU countries exceeding 1,000 Euros, and this
threshold has remained stable over time. For flows directed to EU countries instead,
firms have to declare their transactions if their total exports in the European Union are
above 250,000 Euros in the previous year (this threshold was equal to 104,115 Euros in
1997).
Data on services exports are collected by the NBB to compile the balance of pay-
ments. For the period we consider, the biggest firms had to declare directly to the
NBB any service transaction with a foreign firm exceeding 12,500 Euros (25,000 Euros
from 1997 to 2001); Belgian firms had to declare the export destination, the type of
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service, and the value of the transaction. For all other firms, the bank involved in
the transaction was legally bounded to record the same information and send it to the
NBB. As compared to data from other countries, which are generally survey-based,
the peculiarity of the Belgian collection system is that it provides a quasi-exhaustive
picture of firms, services, and destinations involved in services trade up to 2005.5 The
dataset is organized at the firm-service-destination-year level, firms are identified by
their VAT number, and services are classified following the usual Balance of Payments
codes. We drop from the original data all the transactions referring to “Merchanting”
and “Services between Related Enterprises” because the first also includes the values of
the goods involved and the second does not indicate which service is traded within the
firm and is possibly contaminated by transfer pricing issues.6
Quite uniquely, we are able to put together information on goods and services ex-
ports thanks to the common VAT and destination identifiers. The exhaustiveness of
the trade in services dataset is a great advantage here since it allows us to correctly
identify the “bi-exporters”, i.e. the goods exporters that also export services.7 For the
sake of clarity, two main characteristics of the data should be highlighted. First, since
our data is not transaction-level, we cannot ascertain whether both goods and services
are sold to the same buyer in a given market. While some transaction data now exist
for manufacturing trade in some countries, we are not aware of any dataset recording
both goods and services transactions at the buyer-seller level. So far, Belgian data are
the only available to be quite exhaustive and to allow to put together information on
both goods and services trade. Thus, they are for now the best available data to make
progress in the understanding of the relation between goods and services provision.
Second, whenever a firm exports more than one product in a market, we consider that
the service is associated to all of them and vice versa when firms export more than
one service to a destination. Both issues imply that there might be some noise in the
measurement of bi-exporting. If anything, this will induce an attenuation bias when it
comes to the estimation of the bi-exporting premia.
Trade data is complemented with the annual accounts from the Business Registers
5After 2005 the collection system has become survey-based; therefore, it is not possible to extend
our analysis to more recent years. Refer to Ariu (2016a) for more information about the change in the
collection system.
6The data comprises modes one, two and four of trade in services defined in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). However, since firms do not declare the transaction mode, there is no
direct way to infer it.
7Due to differences in reporting thresholds across datasets, it might be the case that we miss some
of the services/goods exports of small bi-exporters. However, all the descriptive statistics and the
premia we identify hold (even though reduced) when equalizing the reporting thresholds across goods
and services.
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(which cover the population of firms required to file their unconsolidated accounts to the
NBB). From this source we take firm-level turnover, value-added, number of employees,
as well as the industry code of the firm (at the NACE 2-digit level). We use this
information to drop wholesalers’ (NACE codes 51 and 52), which export behavior is
specific. Please note that firms declare their goods and services exports based on the
items they export, not on the industry they declare as their main activity. Therefore,
industry classification is not related to the way in which goods and services trade
information is collected. We also use information on the presence of foreign affiliates
abroad and on foreign ownership status of the firm from the NBB FDI Survey.8 In
all of our estimations, we control by means of adequate dummies for the multinational
nature of exporters and for the presence of affiliates or headquarter in the destination
of exports. Moreover, in robustness checks, we show that our results hold when we
discard flows directed to destinations where firms have foreign affiliates and/or parent
firms. In this way, we ensure that all potential intra-firm trade flows are excluded from
the analysis.9
2.2 Stylized facts
In this subsection, we present some stylized facts on the bi-exporting phenomenon. We
analyze the asymmetric relationship between goods and services for bi-exporting firms,
the frequency of the bi-exporting phenomenon and the performance of bi-exporters
compared to pure goods or services exporters.
8To be included in this survey firms have to comply with at least one of the following requirements:
i) have more than 5 million Euros of financial assets; ii) have more than 10 million Euros equity; iii)
have more than 25 million Euros turnover; iv) report foreign participations in their annual accounts;
v) publish information related to new investments abroad in the Belgian Official Journal. For outward
FDI, the survey has information on all of the foreign affiliates in which the firm has more than 10% of
the common shares with details about the country, sector (NACE 2-digit), and total turnover of the
affiliate. For inward FDI, we have information on all of the foreign owners with more than 10% of the
common shares with indication of the origin and sector of the investors and the percentage of equity
in their hands.
9To avoid estimates to be driven by products which have a high value but low weight, we will
also drop in our regressions observations with missing information on unit value or for which the unit
value is below 0.01, or above 100 times, the median observed among Belgian exporters for each HS6
product-year. This windsorization excludes about 37,000 flows. We will show in the robustness checks
that our results are robust if we include these observations in the analysis.
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2.2.1 Stylized fact 1: bi-exporting is a rare activity, but it accounts for an
important share of overall goods and services exports.
Putting together the trade in goods and trade in services datasets reveals that 31.1%
of Belgian exporters export services only, 60.1% export goods only, and 8.8% export
both goods and services. Moreover, 23.2% of the firm-service-destination-year export
flows are associated with goods and 5.7% of the firm-good-destination-year export flows
are associated with services. Looking by industry, aircraft and spacecraft, railway et
al., ores, slag and ash, fertilizers, and inorganic chemicals are the industries in which
we observe the highest share of bi-exporting. At the product-level, many goods from
the transportation, chemical, and machinery/electrical industries exhibit above-average
shares of bi-exporting flows.
To provide a benchmark on the magnitude of the bi-exporting phenomenon, we
compare the number of bi-exporting firms with the number of multi-product exporters.
In our data, we observe that 62.6% of goods exporters provide more than one product
in foreign markets. When aggregating the product classification at the HS2 level to
be consistent with the disaggregation available for services, the share of multi-product
exporters decreases to 42.4%, which is still much higher than the share of bi-exporters.
Despite being a rare event, bi-exporting accounts for a substantial share of export
values. Bi-exporting flows represent over the period of analysis, 18.0% of Belgian goods
exports and 22.3% of service exports. Bi-exporters account for 44.8% of the value of
Belgian goods exports and 42.3% of services exports. Thus, 8.8% of firms that export
both goods and services account for the bulk of Belgian exports.
2.2.2 Stylized fact 2: bi-exporters export services mostly along with goods.
Focusing on bi-exporters, we can analyze how frequently these firms offer goods and
services together versus separately. On average, bi-exporters offer services alone in only
16.0% of the destinations they serve (median equal to 0), while they export goods alone
in 57.4% of the destinations where they are present (median equal to 69.5%). This tells
us that whenever bi-exporters offer services, they do so in destinations in which they
also export goods. Goods, on the other hand, are frequently exported by bi-exporters
in destinations where they do not provide services, which means that the relationship
between goods and services is asymmetric within bi-exporters.
Considering bi-exporters that export to several destinations, we observe that bi-
exporting occurs in only 26.3% of the destinations where they are present. Multi-
product exporters, instead, sell more than one product in 46.3% of the destinations they
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serve;10 hence, bi-exporting is much less frequent than multi-product exporting not only
across firms, as shown in the previous subsection, but also within firms. Moreover, this
highlights that there is some variation in the occurrence of bi-exporting within firms
across destinations that can be exploited for identification.
In terms of export shares, when firms export both goods and services in a des-
tination, services represent, on average, 39.3% of bi-exporters’ overall exports in that
destination (median equal to 27.5%). If we consider total exports of bi-exporters (across
all destinations), services represent an average of 29.3% of overall firm-level foreign sales
(median equal to 9.0%); hence, goods remain, on average, the primary activity of bi-
exporters.
2.2.3 Stylized fact 3: bi-exporting is associated with better goods export
performance both across and within firms.
The fact that bi-exporters are few but account for a substantial share of exports suggests
that they are larger than pure goods or services exporters. To analyze this feature more
in depth, we regress various firm-level performance indicators on a dummy identifying
bi-exporters, controlling for industry (NACE 2-digit)-year fixed effects. The reference
category in this setting is pure goods and pure services exporters. Table 1 shows
that bi-exporters outperform pure goods and pure services exporters in all dimensions.
Interestingly, the export premium in terms of services is actually less than half of the
goods exports one.
Table 1: Bi-exporters’ performance premia
Dep. Var. Log Goods Log Services Log # of Log Turnover Log Turnover 1 Affiliates 1 Foreign
Exports Exports Employees per Employee Abroad Owned
Bi-Exporter 2.6628a 0.9357a 1.4374a 1.8683a 0.3233a 0.0167a 0.0079a
(0.025) (0.032) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 107,557 66,273 140,766 152,129 137,352 157,664 157,664
R-squared 0.3007 0.1798 0.2003 0.2008 0.1581 0.0134 0.0177
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include industry (NACE 2-digit)-year fixed effects. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c
p<0.1
To go further in the assessment of the bi-exporters’ success and to understand further
the goods-services relation within exporters, we compare the goods and services export
flows of bi-exporters to those of pure goods exporters for manufacturing exports and
10When we compute the frequency of bi-exporting and multi-product exporting at the firm-product
level, these shares rise to 39.0% and 91.1% respectively. This rise reflects the fact that not all the
products in the export portfolio of a firm are sold together with services or with other goods. Taking
this into account, bi-exporting still remains much rarer than multi-product exporting.
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Table 2: Bi-exporting versus pure goods or services export flows
Dep. Var. Log Goods Log Services
Exportsfct Exportsfct
Bi-Expfct 1.2443
a -0.4841a
(0.017) (0.020)
Observations 1,012,012 201,495
R-squared 0.1590 0.0585
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions include destination-year fixed effects. a
p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
those of pure services exporters for services flows. This is done by regressing separately
for goods and services the exports of firm f to destination d at time t on a dummy
identifying firms that export both goods and services in that destination, Bi-Expfct,
and country-year fixed effects. Table 2 shows that within the same destination country
and year, goods exports of bi-exporters are on average bigger than those of pure goods
exporters. The opposite is true for services exports. These results coupled with the
observation that services are almost never exported without goods by the bi-exporters
and that they represent only a small fraction of their total exports reinforces the idea
that goods are the essential activity of bi-exporters, while services are an optional and
minor item in their export activities. For this reason, in the rest of the paper we will
focus on goods exports and try to understand whether services can actually help bi-
exporters boost their manufacturing sales compared to pure goods exporters in foreign
markets.
In order to understand further the positive correlation between the presence of
services and the manufacturing export performance of bi-exporters, we compare man-
ufacturing export flows associated with services to flows without services within the
same product-destination-year by means of the following regression:
Log Expfkdt = α0 + α1Servfdt + α2Xf(kd)t + λkdt + 󰂃fkdt (1)
where Log Expfkdt indicates the (log) exported value of firm f for product k in
country d and year t. Among the explanatory variables, Servfdt is our main variable
of interest: it is a dummy that is equal to 1 when firm f bi-exports, i.e. when it
also exports services to destination d at time t. λkdt is a product-destination-year
fixed effect, and the vector Xf(kd)t contains firm-year, firm-destination-year, and firm-
product-destination-year covariates. In particular, we control for the log number of
products exported by firm f in destination d, the experience of firm f with product k
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Table 3: Bi-exporting goods sales premium
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt
1 Servfdt 0.582
a 0.268a
(0.025) (0.020)
Log # Productsfdt -0.475
a 0.706a
(0.005) (0.006)
Log Turnover/Lft 0.296
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.491
a 0.962a
(0.005) (0.005)
1 MNEft 0.464
a
(0.012)
1 AFFfdt 0.392
a 0.294a
(0.026) (0.023)
1 PARfdt 0.150
a 0.202a
(0.034) (0.032)
1 Service Industryft -0.398
a
(0.014)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE No Yes
Observations 2,106,302 1,652,189
R-squared 0.482 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level
in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
in country d11 and the log turnover per worker of firm f as a measure of the average
productivity of the firm at time t. We also identify multinational firms thanks to a
dummy, MNEft, as well as the destinations where they have foreign affiliates (AFFfdt)
and/or parent firms (PARfdt). Finally, we control for a dummy that equals 1 if the
firm belongs to the service sector. Following Moulton (1990) who suggests to cluster
standard errors in the same dimensions as the main variable of interest, i.e. the dummy
Servfdt, we cluster standard errors at the firm-destination-year level. All the results of
the paper hold when clustering standard errors at the firm or firm and destination-year
level.
Results are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The dummy identifying bi-exporting
flows (Servfdt) is positive and significant: all else equal, for a given product in a given
destination market, bi-exporters sell on average 58% more than normal goods exporters
(i.e. firms that only provide goods). Bi-exporters are, therefore, not just larger firms
overall, but they also outperform normal goods exporters in terms of goods sales in
11We proxy experience with the log number of consecutive years of presence of firm f and product
k in country d at time t. Since they are available, we also use trade data for years 1995 and 1996 to
compute this proxy.
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the destinations where they provide services. Control variables have the expected sign:
more productive, more experienced, and multinational firms sell more. On the contrary,
firms that declare a service sector as their main activity sell less. This is consistent with
the idea that their competitive advantage does not lie in manufacturing activities. Also,
in this specification, the higher the number of products sold by a firm in a market, the
lower its sales for a given good.
In column (2) of Table 3, we further control for firm-product-year fixed effects. In
this way, we can wash away any firm-product-year determinant of export performance
that is correlated with the provision of services, such as unobserved firm-product pro-
ductivity. The estimation now amounts to a difference-in-difference where, for a given
product and a given year, we compare in two different destinations firms that never
export services with their product to firms that export services in one destination but
not in the other. In this more demanding specification, bi-exporting is still associated
with a premium in terms of goods export values. It is, however, considerably reduced
and equal to nearly 27%. The lower premium in column (2) as compared to column (1)
suggests that bi-exporters have unobserved characteristics that make them able to sell
more of their product whatever the destination; but, even when controlling for these
characteristics, they still outperform the normal goods exporters in the destinations
where they bi-export. This positive correlation between firm-level sales of goods and
services provision is suggestive of complementarities between the two types of activ-
ities. Regarding the other controls, the main change is observed for the number of
products exported by a firm in a destination, for which the sign of the coefficient is now
reversed. Once we control for firm-product-year fixed effects, it appears that a wider
product scope in a given destination is associated with higher sales, on average, for each
product. The reason why the across-firm specification offers a different picture is that
a firm-level product portfolio is generally composed of one or a few “main” products
and several “fringe” products; multi-product firms might not perform as well for these
fringe products as compared to firms for which these products are the main activity.
The within-firm specification controls for the product-specific ability of the firm and
thus neutralizes this unobserved ability effect.
2.2.4 Further descriptive results
We present here some additional exercises to qualify more extensively the firm-product-
destination regularities just highlighted.
First, we investigate whether the markets where bi-exporters provide services exhibit
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specific characteristics as compared to the destinations where they only export goods.
To answer this question, we analyze the probability of bi-exporting in a gravity setting.
We focus on firms that export services to at least one destination in a given year, and on
destinations where these firms export goods. Our dependent variable is equal to 1 when
firm f provides services in destination d at time t and zero when it provides goods only.
This variable is regressed on firm-year fixed effects and on gravity covariates taken from
the GeoDist Dataset of CEPII.12 Results in Table 4 show that the provision of services by
bi-exporters follows the gravity law. Among the destinations where they exports goods,
bi-exporters provide services in bigger, richer and less distant markets. Bi-exporting
is also more likely in destinations which share a common border, a common language
or former colonial linkages with Belgium. Note that these results are conditional on
exporting goods, and thus should not be seen as a way to assess how much services
exports follow gravity as compared to goods.
Table 4: Market determinants of the probability to be a bi-exporter
Dep. Var. 1Servfdt
Log Populationdt 0.0360
a 0.0323a
(0.002) (0.002)
Log GDP per capitadt 0.0376
a 0.0372a
(0.002) (0.002)
Log Distancedt -0.0578
a -0.0264a
(0.004) (0.003)
Contiguitydt 0.1709
a
(0.013)
Common Languagedt 0.0078
c
(0.005)
Colonydt 0.1024
a
(0.014)
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 169,621 169,621
R-squared 0.3395 0.3558
Note: Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered
at the destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1
Second, we run the same type of regression as in Table 3 but use a different speci-
fication with firm-product-destination and product-destination-year fixed effects. This
strategy only relies on the time variations in the data, comparing the firms that switch
status in terms of bi-exporting to firms that keep the same status over the entire period.
In this more demanding specification, the sales premium remains positive and signif-
icant (Table A-1 in the Appendix); however, identification here crucially depends on
the exact moment in which firms sell the good and the service. For several services like
12Available at http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6
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technical assistance, maintenance or repair, the export timing of the two activities is not
obviously coincident; still, we might observe both activities in the same year because
they are provided to different consumers (the service being provided to consumers who
bought the good in previous years). We prefer not enter the question of the timing here
and thus stick to the cross-sectional approach in the rest of the paper.
Third, we divide the service dummy into ten different types of services following the
Balance of Payments nomenclature. We observe in Table A-2 in the Appendix that the
relationship between the provision of services and firm-level sales of goods is positive and
highly significant for Transport, Financial, Computer, and Business services.13 These
services comprise, in particular, firm-level loans for the purchase of their goods, the IT
services related to the installation, and the exploitation of the communication systems,
maintenance, repair, consultancy and assistance with the use of manufacturing goods.
This heterogeneity is thus in line with the idea that the services that are correlated
with higher sales for goods are indeed complementary to them.
Fourth, Table A-3 in the Appendix shows that the sales premium associated with the
provision of services is much stronger for the core product than for the fringe products
of the firm; hence, there is substantial heterogeneity in the positive correlation between
goods sales and services provision across the products in the bi-exporters’ product
portfolio. That the correlation between goods sales and services provision is much
stronger for the main product, suggests that the fringe products may be themselves
complements of the core product (Bernard et al., 2017a; Eckel and Riezman, 2016).
Fifth, we test whether our empirical regularities are affected by the difference in the
declaration thresholds across goods and services. Specifically, we drop goods export
flows below 25,000 Euros, which is the highest threshold used for services export flows
from 1997 to 2001. This operation erases around 66% of the original sample. Despite
the important loss in terms of number of observations, all the descriptive statistics
highlighted aboveremain mostly unchanged. In particular, all the premia of Table 3
remain significant even tough reduced (Table A-4 in Appendix A). The reduction in
the size of the threshold is not surprising since very small goods export flows, which
are generally not associated with services, are now dropped from the sample.
13The coefficient is also positive and significant for Personal and Cultural services, but this concerns
a very small number of flows.
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3 Instrumental variable estimations
So far, our results show that the provision of services is robustly associated with greater
firm-level sales of goods in a destination. However, even if we control for different
supply- and demand-side determinants of firm-level goods export performance in a des-
tination, we cannot claim yet that this positive correlation reflects a causal and unbiased
effect of services provision on goods sales. As already acknowledged, measurement error
in the bi-exporting phenomenon might bias downward the coefficient we estimate on the
dummy Servfdt. Moreover, firm-product-destination unobserved factors could jointly
determine firm-level goods export performance and the decision to provide services in
a destination. More specifically, we can think of two possible sources of endogeneity.
First, as shown by di Comite et al. (2014), firms might face country-specific tastes for
their products. This means that for a given product, the relative sales of firms might
vary across markets even though their relative prices remain the same. If these demand
idiosyncrasies apply to all of the items proposed by a firm in a market, the positive
correlation we measure between services provision and firm-level goods exports in a des-
tination might just reflect the fact that bi-exporters export services in markets where
they specifically face a high demand for their products. Second, Mayer et al. (2016)
show that when multi-product exporters face a positive demand shock, they skew their
sales towards their best performing product and extend the range of the products they
export to products for which they have a relatively lower productivity. This complex
dynamics of the product mix can also affect our estimation of the bi-exporter premium.
In the following, we propose an IV strategy to purge our estimates from the firm-
product-destination endogeneity just highlighted and dig deeper into the possible mech-
anisms at play.
3.1 Estimation strategy
We take the specification in column (2) of Table 3 as our benchmark, and we look for
an unbiased estimation of the coefficient α1 in the following regression:
Log Expfkdt = α0 + α1Servfdt + α2Xfkdt + λkdt + κfkt + 󰂃fkdt (2)
where Log Expfkdt represents the log value of sales of firm f for product k in destination
d at time t, Xfkdt stands for firm-product-destination-year covariates, λkdt is a product-
destination-year fixed effect, and κfkt a firm-product-year fixed effect. We assume that
the dummy Servfdt is determined by a latent variable and defined as follows:
18
Servfdt =
󰀻󰀿󰀽1 if θXfdt + µdt + δBIft ∗ SRId + ξfdt ≥ 00 if θXfdt + µdt + δBIft ∗ SRId + ξfdt < 0
where Xfdt is a vector of firm-year and firm-destination-year covariates, µdt is a destination-
year fixed effect, BIft*SRId is an excluded variable that we explain below and ξfdt is
the error term. The endogeneity of Servfdt we just discussed comes from the possible
correlation between 󰂃fkdt and ξfdt. To solve for this issue, and given the dichotomous
nature of Servfdt, we follow Wooldridge (2002) and implement a two-step procedure.
14
We first estimate the determinants of the probability that firm f exports services to
destination d at time t thanks to a probit model. We then use the fitted probabilities
from the probit (that are thus purged from the presence of the firm-product-destination
unobserved factors contained in ξfdt) as an instrument for Servfdt in a standard 2SLS.
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This method breaks the correlation between ξfdt and 󰂃fkdt which causes the endogeneity
issue and provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of services provision on firm-level
goods exports. Wooldridge (2002) argues that this procedure has several advantages.
First, the 2SLS standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically valid: we do not
need to adjust the standard errors to account for the fact that our instrument is an esti-
mated variable. Second, this estimator has nice robustness properties; in particular, as
long as the fitted probabilities are significantly correlated with the endogenous variable,
the probit used to build the instrument does not need to be correctly specified.16
Note that, in principle, since the vector of fitted probabilities ˆServfdt is a non linear
function of its determinants, this model can work without an excluded variable; how-
ever, the identification would only come from the non-linearity of the function used to
build the instrument, thus limiting its explanatory power and the precision of the IV
estimates. This is why we decide to introduce into the probit a firm-destination spe-
cific variable that explains why firms export services in a given market without directly
affecting firm-level manufacturing sales in that market given the controls and fixed ef-
fects included in the second-stage regression. We build this variable as the interaction
between a firm-level product portfolio characteristic (regardless of the destination) BIft
and a proxy for country-level barriers to services trade SRId.
14See Chapter 18, section 18.4.1.
15We have also performed a standard 2SLS procedure where BIft*SRId is used as an instrument. This
amounts to estimating the determinants of Servfdt with a linear probability model. This is problematic
however as more than 25% of the predictions lie outside the [0-1] interval, which undermines the
efficiency of the estimation. This is why we use the procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2002).
16As shown by Imbens and Wooldridge (2007), the robustness of the second step to the specification
of the probit function is also a nice feature of this estimator compared to a control function approach
where a probit model would be estimated in the first stage and the inverse Mills ratio introduced as a
regressor in the second stage regression.
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The firm-level product portfolio characteristic relies on the idea that not all the
products are equally likely to be associated with services. Depending on both tech-
nology and preferences, some products are certainly more “bundleable” with services
than others. For example, parts of aircraft or data-processing machines are exported
frequently with many services such as installation, maintenance, and repair. Instead,
some vegetable and textile products are never associated with services. In our data, we
can compute for each product k its “bundleability” index. We define it as the average
share of transactions that are bundled with services, computed across all of the Belgian
exporters of product k over the period under study. As mentioned in section 2.2, many
goods from the transportation, chemical, and machinery/electrical industries appear as
highly “bundleable”, and financial, computer and business services are often associated
with goods. This index is then averaged across all of the products in the portfolio of
firm f in year t. The resulting variable BIft should be positively correlated with the
probability of bi-exporting, and it varies across firms due to differences in the product
portfolio of each firm. Note that any remaining demand shock common to all firms
selling the same product that could potentially be embedded in BIft is controlled for by
means of the product-destination-year dummies in equation 2 and thus cannot bias our
estimation.17 The average (median) number of Belgian exporters active in a given HS6
over the period is equal to 82 (36); we are thus confident that one single firm cannot
directly affect the “bundleability” index at the product-level. In other words, given
the high number of observations for each product, the endogeneity of our bundleability
index with firms’ individual performance is not likely.
To obtain the second level of variation needed to build an instrument that is firm-
destination specific, and thus varies within firms across markets, we interact the BIft
with a measure of trade restrictiveness for services, i.e. the “Service Restrictiveness
Index”, SRId, provided by the World Bank.
18 This provides the variation needed to
explain why the same firm does not necessarily bi-export in all of the destinations where
it provides goods in a given year.
The second-step regression includes firm-product-year and product-destination-year
fixed effects, so that the direct effect of each element of the interaction on firm-
17Ideally, it would have been best to compute the bundleability index for another country. Unfor-
tunately, this is not possible because, to the best of our knowledge, Belgium is the only country for
which the information on goods and services trade is quasi exhaustive and can be merged together for
those years. We believe this is not especially problematic because we have a great number of firms
that export the same product.
18Note that, since our specification includes destination-year fixed effects, we do not need to include
this variable alone in the probit.
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product-destination-year exports is accounted for; we can thus reasonably assume that
BIft×SRId is not directly correlated with the unobserved firm-product-destination spe-
cific determinants of manufacturing success. Note in particular that, in case of cor-
related demand shocks between goods and services, country-level services trade re-
strictions might also proxy for the demand for the goods associated with these services.
However, as long as these correlated demand shocks are common to all potential suppli-
ers of the goods in the destination country, our destination-product-year fixed effects in
the second step capture their direct effect on firm-level sales of goods. The same reason-
ing applies in case of specifically higher sales for the goods that are more “bundleable”.
Therefore, the only possible remaining endogeneity issue arises if within a given HS6
product, a firm produces different varieties whose specific appeal to consumers in a
given destination varies systematically with the provision of services in that destination
and our excluded variable BIft×SRId. In this case, both the set of fixed effects and the
IV strategy would not be able to fully solve the problem. We discuss this in section 5
when dealing with the case of multi-quality firms.
Finally, we also tackle the possible endogeneity of the measure of product scope of
firm f in destination d at time t. As emphasized in the introduction, the same com-
plementarity might, indeed, not solely apply to services, but also between the goods
exported by multi-product exporters, such as the iPad and its cover. Product scope
is thus subject in our regressions to the same endogeneity concerns as the provision of
services.19 We thus need to find an excluded variable that can explain the number of
products exported by a firm in a given destination and is exogenous to the manufactur-
ing sales of that firm in that destination. We propose an instrument whose rationale
is close to the one of the “bundleability” index defined for services exports. For each
HS6 product k, we calculate the average size (across all years and destinations) of the
product scope of the firms that export k. We then average this statistic across all of the
products exported by firm f in country d at time t. This provides us with a predicted
measure of the product scope of firm f in destination d at time t. Again, since it is based
on a parameter attached to each of the products in the firm-destination level portfolio,
it should not be correlated with unobserved firm-product-destination determinants of
export performance and allow for a proper identification.
19Please note that the identification of the goods that exhibit the same type of asymmetric relation-
ship as the one documented for goods and services is beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.2 Results
The results of our IV strategy are presented in column (1) of Table 5.20 They confirm
that bi-exporting has a positive and significant effect on the goods export values. Rela-
tive to pure goods exporters, bi-exporters export, on average, 76% more of their goods
in destinations where they provide services than in destinations where they do not. The
magnitude of this effect is boosted as compared to the fixed effect estimation, implying
that the biases highlighted in the previous subsections were leading to a downward bias
overall. The effect of the product scope on firm-product-destination sales remains posi-
tive and significant after the implementation of our IV strategy, but contrary to services
provision, it is slightly reduced compared to the fixed-effect estimation in column (2)
of Table 3. The coefficients on the other variables do not change much.
To get a sense of how much services matter for aggregate manufacturing exports,
we run the following exercise: we assume that the possibility of exporting services is
shut down for all of the bi-exporting flows in our dataset, and using the coefficient
estimated in column (1) of Table 5, we re-compute the value of these manufacturing
flows absent the service. With this procedure, we find that the overall manufacturing
exports of bi-exporters would decrease by nearly 22.4% on average, implying a 11.8%
decrease in overall Belgian manufacturing exports. Of course, this exercise ignores
general equilibrium effects and assumes that services are exported along with all the
products sold by a firm in a destination. For this reason, we should certainly see
it as an upper bound of the contribution of services to manufacturings sales; but it
definitely suggests that the boosting effect of services on manufacturing performance is
not negligible and is worthy of investigation.
Since our data on trade in goods contains the value and the quantity exported,
we can compute the unit value of each firm-product-destination export flow. We can
then use these unit values as a proxy for prices and decompose the sales premium
into a quantity and a price effect. This can help us understand the channels behind
the boost in manufacturing sales caused by the provision of services. The results are
displayed in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 and show that the positive effect on sales
is a combination of both a quantity and a price increase. Relative to normal goods
exporters, bi-exporters charge a price for their good that is 51% higher in destinations
where they provide the service than in destinations where they do not. Importantly,
despite this higher price, bi-exporters manage to sell 25% more in quantity. Note that
the magnitude of the impact we measure for unit values is sensible. In our estimation
20The results of the first-stage probit are presented in Table B-1 of Appendix B.
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Table 5: Bi-exporting: IV results
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
1Servfdt 0.758
a 0.246c 0.512a
(0.159) (0.143) (0.058)
Log # Productsfdt 0.654
a 0.693a -0.040a
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.010
a 1.020a -0.009a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
1AFFfdt 0.253
a 0.302a -0.050a
(0.026) (0.022) (0.011)
1PARfdt 0.216
a 0.254a -0.038a
(0.034) (0.032) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,338,656 1,338,656 1,338,656
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 118.9 118.9 118.9
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a
p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
sample, the coefficient of variation of firm-product unit values across destinations is
equal to 0.41,21 i.e. the same order of magnitude as the price premium associated
with bi-exporting. Consumers are willing to buy more of the product even if it is more
expensive. The association of services together with the goods acts as a positive demand
shifter for the goods, making the product more appealing to consumers. In this sense,
services influence the perceived quality of the product and are an active determinant
of the goods export performance of firms.
We provide in Appendix B different robustness checks to show that our results resist
alternative IV strategies and various sample restictions. First, in the first-stage probit,
we use two alternative excluded variables by interacting the “bundleability” index BIft
with: i) the share of services in the overall imports of the destination d at time t,
IMPSHdt, taken from the Comtrade dataset; ii) the log of overall imports of services by
country d at time t, SIdt (excluding Belgium from trade partners) using the Francois and
Pindyuk (2013) trade in services database. In this way, we can check how sensitive the
results are to alternative proxies for country-level openness to services trade (Tables B-
2 and B-3 in Appendix). Second, we exclude from the estimation sample potential
21For this exercise, we focus on firm-product-year triplets for which we have at least 4 observations
in our sample (i.e. 4 destinations). Quite interestingly, the standard-deviation of unit values within
exporters across markets reported by Manova and Zhang (2012) for Chinese firms is equal to 0.46,
very close to ours. Martin (2012) also reports the within firm-product variation of unit values across
destinations to be large for French firms.
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outliers by dropping those firms for which the share of services in overall exports is
above 50% (their core business being on services rather than manufacturing, Table B-4
in the Appendix). Third, we exclude destinations in which a multinational has either
an affiliate or a parent firm to dissolve any remaining concern about the behavior
of multinationals in countries that are part of their business structure (see table B-5
in Appendix).22 Fourth, we code the Servfdt dummy equal to one only if the firm
exports the services that are significantly associated with higher sales, as discussed in
section 2.2.4 (see Table B-6). Fifth, we run the same regression without windsorizing
the data to get rid of outliers (Table B-7). Sixth, we remove goods export flows below
25,000 euros to match the higher reporting threshold used for services (Table B-8).
Please note that this operation deletes more than 66% of the sample. By removing all
the small goods export flows, it also reduces dramatically the variation that we can
exploit to identify the effect of services provision on goods’ export values, quantities
and prices. Still, we obtain statistically significant results for the values and unit values
of exports, even tough the premium is, as expected, reduced.
4 One-way complementarity and perceived quality:
theory and further evidence
Our analysis shows that services provision allows bi-exporters to sell more of their
goods, all else equal, than standard goods exporters. Bi-exporters increase their sales
by charging a higher price for their good and still selling it in higher quantities than
firms that export the good only. Services, then, look like a determinant of the perceived
quality and vertical differentiation of products.
At first sight, these results could seem consistent with multi-product firm models
under monopolistic competition with variable markups (e.g. Mayer et al., 2014, 2016)
and/or quality differences across varieties (e.g. Manova and Yu, 2017). We argue here
that it is hard to replicate our results with these existing models without positing ex
ante the good quality-services provision nexus. First, absent diseconomies of scope,23 a
standard model of monopolistic competition where each firm can supply a good with or
without a service - a two-product firm - cannot generate the positive effect of services
provision on manufacturing goods’ unit values we find. This is because cross-price
22Remember that in the main specification, intra-firm services trade is already removed from the
estimation sample and we control in the regressions for the fact that a firm has affiliates and/or parent
firms in the destinations where it exports goods.
23See section 5 for a discussion of a supply-side driven price effect.
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elasticities under monopolistic competition are null by assumption. In other words, the
price of the good and the export of a service are the result of independent decisions.
Importantly enough, this is true whatever the demand system considered is - derived
from a CES utility or not.24 Second, the price premium we measure is not simply
reflecting the cost of providing a service, as would be the case with any investment in
product quality (e.g. Eckel et al., 2015). This is because, in our data, the provision of
a service is accounted for in a separate transaction. In other words, the price charged
by the firm for the service is not embodied in the unit-value of the good on which our
empirical analysis is based. Nevertheless, that bi-exporting raises both the price and
the quantity of the good suggests that bi-exporting may act as a demand shifter for the
good. The model we build in this section will help us reinterpret the provision of the
service as a determinant of the perceived quality of the good.
In this section, we depart from existing models in two ways. First, we consider a
model of oligopolistic competition. Under this assumption, goods and services supplied
by a single firm have a direct impact on the market aggregate - the price index - so that
pricing decisions across the service and the good are naturally inter-related. Second,
we consider goods and services as one-way complements. In the words of Chen and
Nalebuff (2006), one-way complementarity implies that the good is essential to the use
of the service but not vice-versa.25 This second assumption ensures that bi-exporters
find it optimal to set a higher price for their good while setting a strictly positive price
for the service. In section 5 we discuss whether alternative theoretical set-ups under
monopolistic competition and endogenous demand shifters may or may not replicate
our empirical findings.
4.1 Preferences
The economy of destination d features a continuum of consumers who share the same
preferences. Each consumer derives her utility from a Cobb-Douglas function over
different goods k ∈ Kd:
U :=
󰁝
Kd
αk log (Ckd) dk
24See also section 5 for a derivation with non-CES preferences.
25One-way complementarity can be seen as a special case of mixed bundling (Adams and Yellen,
1976) where there is no demand for the service alone. The analogy, however, is of little use here as
our data does not allow us to consider mixed-bundling pricing: there is only one price (unit value)
observed for each good in a given destination, whether it is bundled or not.
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where the income shares sum up to one:󰁝
Kd
αkdk = 1
Ckd is the ideal consumption index of good k in destination d and is defined as the
aggregation of the Cfkd consumption indices which are specific to the variety of product
k supplied by firm f in destination d:
Ckd :=
󰀕󰁝
f∈Ωkd
C
σk−1
σk
fkd df
󰀖 σk
σk−1
The set of varieties of product k available in d is defined by Ωkd, and the elasticity
of substitution across varieties is equal to σk. These varieties may be consumed with or
without a service. We denote by gfkd the total consumption of variety fk in destination
d. The amount consumed with a service is denoted by gsfkd ≤ gfkd, and consumption of
the complementary service is denoted by sfkd.
One-way complementarity The consumption index of variety fk in country d is
defined by:
Cfkd =
󰀕󰀃
gfkd − gsfkd
󰀄σk−1
σk +
󰀃
βk min
󰀋
gsfkd, sfkd
󰀌󰀄σk−1
σk
󰀖 σk
σk−1
where min
󰀃
gsfkd, sfkd
󰀄
is a Leontief aggregator and βk a demand shifter.
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This specification implies that the consumption sfkd of the service itself does not
raise the utility of the consumer unless she consumes at least gsfkd ≥ sfkd units of the
good with it. This means that the good is essential while the service is optional. The
CES aggregation of the consumption of the good alone and the bundle implies that the
consumer perceives a good and its service-augmented version as two different varieties.27
The demand shifter βk allows for differences in (perceived) quality between a variety
and its service-augmented version.
A mass of Ld consumers own an equal share of the firms in their economy on top of
26The model can also accommodate imperfect complementarity through a CES aggregator without
qualitatively changing its predictions. This will become clear in section 4.4 when we turn to the
intuitions behind the theoretical channels at play.
27This implies that consumers have a positive demand for both. While it might appear more realistic
to assume heterogeneous consumers, CES preferences can also be seen as a reduced form for a richer
model featuring consumer heterogeneity (see section 5).
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their labor income. Total income amounts to Id and the budget constraint reads as:󰁝
Kd
PkdCkddk ≤ Id
where Pkd is the ideal price index of product k in destination d:
Pkd :=
󰀕󰁝
Ωkd
P1−σkfkd df
󰀖 1
1−σk
The firm-product-destination specific price index aggregates the price of the good alone
and the price of the bundled good. The latter is the sum of the price of the good and
the price of the service pfk + p
s
fk:
Pfkd :=
󰀓
p1−σkfkd + β
σk−1
k
󰀃
pfkd + p
s
fkd
󰀄1−σk󰀔 11−σk
Demand Utility maximization implies gSfk = sfk and yields the direct demand func-
tions of the good and the service:
d
󰀅
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
󰀆
= gfkd = αk Id Pσk−1kd
󰀓
p−σkfkd + β
σk
k
󰀃
pfkd + p
s
fkd
󰀄−σk󰀔 (3)
ds
󰀅
pfkd + p
s
fkd;Pkd
󰀆
= gSfkd = αk Id Pσk−1kd βσkk
󰀃
pfkd + p
s
fkd
󰀄−σk (4)
so that total expenditures on good fk and its complementary service are given by:
Efkd := αk Id
󰀕Pfkd
Pkd
󰀖1−σk
4.2 Firm technology
In the following, we carry out the analysis at the firm level. We take the perspective
of a domestic firm which decides whether or not to export to destination d and, if so,
whether to export a service or not with its good. All workers in the home country
supply one efficiency unit of labor and their wages are normalized to one. Let cfk and
csfk be firm f ’s marginal costs of production of good k and its complementary service,
respectively. Corresponding trade costs are denoted by τkd and τ
s
kd. These costs are
product-country specific: for instance, the cost of supplying communication services
includes trade costs related to the linguistic distance and the good category with which
it is bundled. For the sake of simplicity, we assume further that all firms supplying
good k face the same proportional cost increment when deciding to supply a service
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together with their good.28 Put differently, firms that are good at producing the good
are also good at providing the service, which is in line with our descriptive statistics
that show that bi-exporters are found among the most productive firms. Last, trade
costs to destination d for the goods and services are assumed to differ up to a product-
specific multiplicative term. Taken together these assumptions allow us to work with a
product-specific cost-increment which is inclusive of trade costs:
ωk := 1 +
τskdc
s
fk
τkdcfk
.
In the absence of fixed costs, since consumers’ reservation price for any variety is
infinite, all firms would find it profitable to provide services with their goods at any
cost. We, therefore, assume that firms incur a fixed cost F b29 in order to export a
service with their good. The subset of firms that export a service with their variety of
good k in destination d is denoted by Ωbkd.
Exporters’ operational profits in destination d are given by:
πfkd := (pfkd − τkdcfk)Ld d
󰀅
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
󰀆
+󰀃
psfkd − τ skdcsfk
󰀄
Ld d
s
󰀅
pfkd + p
s
fkd;Pkd
󰀆
1Ωbkd [f ] ∀f ∈ Ω
b
kd (5)
where 1Ωbkd [f ] = 1 is a bi-exporter indicator. For a bi-exporter, i.e. 1Ωbkd [f ] = 1, the
maximization problem boils down to one of a two-product firm whose core competence
is the good to be consumed alone while its side product is made of the good to be
consumed with the service. Producing and shipping the former requires a constant
marginal cost τkdcfk while the bundle requires τkdcfk + τ
s
kdc
s
fk.
Importantly, because oligopolistic competition reintroduces some interdependence
among the sales of the various firms’ “products”, the profits made on the good-service
bundle are directly related to the profits made on the good alone. In the end, an
individual firm f will be a bi-exporter of product k if the profit differential between
being a bi-exporter or not in destination d is higher than the fixed cost F b, which is
not equivalent to assuming that the profits made on the good-service bundle alone are
larger than F b. Hence, while the decision to export goods and services is the outcome
of a joint maximization problem, any element that affects the fixed cost of exporting
services F b faced by a firm allows us to isolate theoretically the impact of services
28This is close in spirit to the multi-product firm model by Mayer et al. (2014) where firms born
with a different productivity for their core product face the same increase in marginal cost as they
expand their product portfolio.
29Note that to replicate our findings according to which bi-exporters are larger in the cross-section,
these fixed costs would need to be heterogeneous across firms or the parameter range restricted so that
the profit function remains supermodular in productivity and bi-exporting. Our predictions below
however are all at the firm-level.
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exports on goods exports. This is exactly the spirit of the IV strategy we proposed
in the previous section. Moreover, since oligopolistic firms decide on their price based
on their market share, both the price and the quantities of the good alone depend
on the decision of whether to sell both goods and services.30 This way of considering
the behavior of the firm is to be contrasted with a multi-product firm model under
monopolistic competition where decisions across products are independent.
4.3 Firm behavior
We do not model how firms initially decide to export. We focus only on their decision
and on the impact of exporting a service along with their good, in line with our empirical
exercise on manufacturing goods exporters.
Before solving the model, we should note that Pkd summarizes the demand linkages
between goods: under monopolistic competition, the impact of the price of any individ-
ual variety on this aggregate would be negligible; therefore the optimal pricing rule of
a firm would be independent on whether this firm is supplying a service or not. Impor-
tantly enough, this is not an artefact of CES preferences; it is due to the fact that under
monopolistic competition, cross-price elasticities of demand are null across the varieties
sold by a firm. Here instead, when oligopolistic firms compete a` la Bertrand (similar
results hold under Cournot), they take into account their impact on the price-index Pkd
(See Anderson et al., 1992; Yang and Heijdra, 1993), and cross-price elasticities across
their product scope are no longer negligible.
4.4 Prices, quantities and sales
The first-order conditions with respect to pfk and p
s
fk lead to the pricing rule:
Mfkd := pfkd/cfkd = psfkd/csfkd (6)
where the mark-up Mfkd is given by:
Mfkd = Mk[Sfkd] := 1 + 1
(σk − 1) (1− Sfkd)
Oligopolistic firms charge a markup that is a convex function of their market share.
30Empirically of course, we do not observe a firm exporting the same good with and without a
service to the same destination. This is why in the empirical part, we compare firms across markets
introducing both firm-product-year and product-destination-year fixed effects.
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Using (3) and (4) leads to the implicit definition of an oligopolistic firm’s market share31
Sfkd:
Pσk−1kd (τkd cfk)1−σk
󰀓
1 + (ωk/βk)
1−σk 1Ωbkd
󰀔
= Sfkd Mk[Sfkd]σk−1 (7)
Equation (7) shows that, all else equal, bi-exporters have a larger market share and
thus charge a higher markup. Plugging the optimal prices into the demand functions
leads to the good and service output chosen by a bi-exporting firm:
gfkd = αk Id Pσk−1kd M−σkfkd (τkdcfk)−σk
󰀓
1 + (ωk/βk)
−σk 1Ωbkd [f ]
󰀔
(8)
sfkd = αk Id Pσk−1kd M−σkfkd (τkdcfk)−σk (ωk/βk)−σk 1Ωbkd [f ] (9)
Inspecting (8) shows that supplying a service, i.e. 1Ωbkd [f ] = 1 has two opposite
effects on the quantities of good k sold by firm f in destination d, captured respectively
by (1 + (ωk/βk)
−σk) and M−σkfkd .
Firms now face a positive demand for the bundled good which increases the demand
addressed to variety fk by a factor (1 + (ωk/βk)
−σk). This demand for the bundle,
however, cannibalizes the sales of the good alone. All else equal, firms increase their
markup and restrict their supply of the good alone by a factor M−σkfkd . In a model of
monopolistic competition, there would be no impact on the price, and the output would
always increase. Under oligopoly, the price effect goes against this increase in output
and could even potentially offset it (in that case, it would have to be that an increase
in the sales of the services does more than offset the decrease in the sales of the good).
Our empirical analysis finds evidence for a price effect which is never strong enough to
reverse the positive impact on output. Furthermore, we show below that, theoretically,
the perceived quality of the good necessarily increases with the provision of the service.
4.5 Perceived quality
Equation (8) shows that, conditional on price, the provision of services acts as a de-
mand shifter for the good. Given this expression, the demand shifter is equivalent to
a factor ηfkd :=
󰀓
1 + (ωk/βk)
−σk 1Ωbkd [f ]
󰀔 1
σk−1 before the consumed quantity of variety
fk in the utility function of consumers from country d, so that the demand function in
31Our specification of consumer preferences implies that the relevant market on which firms compete
consists of horizontally differentiated goods and their service-augmented versions. Therefore, the
market share is the share of a firm’s overall sales - including both goods and services sales - relative
to its competitors.
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equation (3) could be written as follows:
d
󰀅
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
󰀆
= gfkd = αk Id Pσk−1kd p−σkfkd ησk−1fkd (10)
According to our model, supplying a service along with a good translates unam-
biguously into a larger perceived quality of the good. Using (10), we can thus derive a
measure of perceived quality as in Khandelwal et al. (2013). Taking the logarithm of
this expression, we obtain:
log gfkd + σk log pfkd = logαk Id + (σk − 1) logPkd + (σk − 1) log ηfkd (11)
From an empirical viewpoint, equation (11) can be estimated with our data as:
log qfkdt + σk log uvfkdt = λkdt + 󰂃fkdt (12)
where qfkdt and uvfkdt are the quantity and price charged by firm f for product k
sold to country d at time t, and λkdt is a product-destination-year fixed effect. We can
then recover the residual, and in light of our model, interpret it as a function of the
estimated firm-product-destination level demand shifter such that log ηˆfkdt =
󰂃fkdt
σk−1 .
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Intuitively, a higher ηfkdt means that, conditional on price, firm f faces a higher demand
for its good than its competitors.
To assess the impact of services provision on the perceived quality of goods, we
apply the same empirical strategy as the one used for values, quantities, and prices
taking our measure of perceived quality, log ηˆfkdt, as the dependent variable. Table 6
shows that the provision of services is positively associated with the perceived quality
of the good.
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of this effect, we calculate standardized
coefficients.33 When considering all the firms in our sample we find that within firm-
product across destinations, a one standard deviation increase in the probability of
exporting services together with goods is associated with a 0.09 increase in the demand
shifter. To provide a benchmark, we compute the same for the product scope variable
emphasized as an important determinant of firms’ appeal by Bernard et al. (2017a) and
Hottman et al. (2016): a one standard deviation increase in the size of the product
32We use the product-destination specific elasticity of substitution estimated by Broda et al. (2006).
33Put differently, we calculate the effect of one standard deviation of each explanatory variable x as a
share of one standard deviation of the dependent variable y: βx×sdxsdy . Standard deviations are computed
based on the variables demeaned in the product-destination-year and firm-product-year dimensions,
since our regression controls for fixed effects in these dimensions.
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scope is associated with a 0.13 increase in the demand shifter. When we compute
these contributions for bi-exporters only, these figures are respectively equal to 0.17
and 0.13. While both effects are sizeable, services provision explains a greater share
of the variations in the perceived quality of bi-exporters’ products across destinations
as compared to product scope. We can thus conclude that services are an important
determinant of the perceived quality of bi-exporters’ products.
Table 6: Perceived quality - IV results
(1)
Dep. Var. log ηˆfkdt
Servfdt 0.753
a
(0.126)
Log # Productsfdt 0.267
a
(0.011)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.489
a
(0.005)
AFFfdt 0.057
a
(0.025)
PARfdt 0.077
a
(0.028)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,166,572
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 99.28
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
5 Alternative interpretations of our results
Our model relies on the assumption of one-way complementarity between goods and
services to explain the patterns we find in the data. We now review alternative inter-
pretations and explanations for both our theoretical and empirical results.
Non-CES preferences under monopolistic competition.
As mentioned at the beginning of section 4, we show briefly below that under mo-
nopolistic competition and one-way complementarity, even when departing from CES
preferences, bundling a service along with a good does not have any impact on its price.
This is why we have considered an oligopolistic market structure instead. For the sake
of brevity, we normalize population size to one, consider a one-sector of economy, and
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symmetric preferences. In the spirit of Parenti et al. (2017) i.e. without specifying con-
sumers’ utility function, the inverse demand for the good and the good-service bundle
respectively can generally be written as p(gf − gsf ,g,λ) and p(gsf ,g,λ) where g is the
consumption vector of all varieties and their service-augmented version while λ is the
marginal utility of income. Under monopolistic competition and in the absence of cost
linkages, the firm’s profit maximization problem remains separable in
󰀃
gf − gsf
󰀄
and
gsf . In other words, the price set by a firm for its good does not depend on whether
it is supplying a service or not. This is because monopolistically competitive firms
are (g,λ)-takers by assumption, whether the price-elasticity of demand (hence their
markups) is constant or not.
It should be clear however that this does not rule out alternative explanations under
monopolistic competition where supply-side determinants impact demand directly: this
is the case when consumers’ willingness to pay increases with product quality (Manova
Yu, 2017) or when the breadth of a firm’s product range raises the demand for any of
its products (the demand-scope complementarities assumption in Bernard et al. 2017).
We discuss the role of product quality and richer models of multi-product firms with
one or two-way complementarity in the next subsections.
Supply-side driven price effect: diseconomies of scope.
Under monopolistic competition, without any (endogenous) demand-side explanation,
reconciling larger sales of the good with a higher price is simply not possible as it
contradicts the law of demand. However, sticking to monopolistic competition, we
could assume that preferences feature one-way complementarity which would ensure
that bi-exporters sell greater quantities; as for the price of the good to be higher when
a service is jointly exported, we would need to assume cost linkages across products.
Specifically, the marginal cost of production of the good would need to go up - leading
to a higher price - when bundled with a service, i.e. decreasing returns to scope. Now,
for the overall sales of the good to go up as observed in the data, it would have to
be that the sales of the bundle do more than offset the decline induced by decreasing
returns to scope. Under certain parameter restrictions this is perfectly reasonable and
would replicate our empirical comparisons within countries across firms; however, the
explanation based on diseconomies of scope sounds much less convincing when coming
to within-firm across-country comparisons. Replicating our results would require that
decreasing scope economies are destination specific, i.e. producing a good would be
costlier - net of the service production cost itself - in a destination when bundled with
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a service to be shipped to that same destination.
Supply-side driven price effect: product-quality.
Although our dataset contains disagreggated firm-product level data, it could well be
that there is some unobserved quality heterogeneity within a given firm-HS6. Specifi-
cally, it could be that the quality-mix of a given HS6 varies within a firm-product across
destinations. To replicate the positive association between unit values and services pro-
vision, it must be that firms export a service only when their (unobserved) product mix
includes higher quality varieties.
The literature on multi-product firms has emphasized product selection as a driver
of quality-mix variations across destinations. Firms typically export their core prod-
uct to most destination markets while their peripheral products reach only a subset
of them. Now, if services are complementary to high-quality products, our empirical
findings then imply that the core-product of a bi-exporting firm is a low quality good.
While not implausible, this tends to go against recent empirical evidence showing that
multi-quality firms tend to have higher quality goods as their core products. Replicat-
ing our findings requires instead that firms adjust the quality of their product to each
destination market (e.g. Manova and Yu, 2017). A framework with quality-to-market
production - even under monopolistic competition - where supplying higher quality is
complementarity to the provision of services could well explain why firms sell goods
with a higher price in higher quantities.34 However, and contrary to variable markups,
adjusting quality to each destination market is costly. An explanation of our findings
based on variable quality implies that these firms’ production process is flexible enough
to avoid diseconomies of scope arising from quality differentiation. Disentangling fur-
ther the quality-to-market channel from varying markups is a direction that we leave
for future research.
Two-way complementarity between goods and services.
It could be the case that the varieties exported by bi-exporters always come with a
service, but that the latter is provided by another firm. In this case, there would be
two-way complementarity between goods and services, but firms would sometimes just
decide not to provide the service directly. Under this assumption, we can compare the
34We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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price and quantities of an exporter when the service is produced in house and when it
is not. We make three observations.
First, if complementarity is captured through a Leontiev aggregator, the price of
the good and the service can no longer be disentangled as only the sum of the prices
matters for the consumer. The impact on quantities, however, can be derived. When
the service is provided outside the firm by a monopolist, the problem for each variety
boils down to a Cournot (1838) complementary monopolists’ problem. In that case,
if a single firm were to provide both complementary products, it would increase the
quantity supplied by decreasing the price of the bundle; but we cannot say anything on
the respective price of the good and the service.
Second, to get some prediction on prices, it is enough to introduce some degree of
imperfect complementarity, departing thereby from a Leontiev aggregator. In that case,
producing both the good and the service in-house tends to increase the sales of both
and the quantities of both, but also reduces their prices (Tirole, 1988; Belleflamme and
Peitz, 2010). This is consistent with the model of Eckel and Riezman (2016), but not
with the positive price effect we have identified.
Third, to obtain the positive price effect we find in the data in a model featuring
two-way complementarity between goods and services, we could assume demand-scope
spillovers a la Bernard et al. (2017a). It is noteworthy that this assumption does
not relate directly to the Industrial Organization dichotomy between substitutes and
complements we discuss here. It states that everything else being equal, the willingness
to pay for a given variety will increase with the number of goods supplied by the firm.
Therefore, the demand-scope spillover hypothesis does not take a stand on whether
goods are substitutes or complements conditional on the breadth of firms’ product
range.35 Following that hypothesis, if supplying a service to a market entails a positive
demand shifter - beyond traditional cross-price effects - a model of multi-product firms
with two-way complementarity and demand-scope spillovers could also rationalize our
results. We see our framework with one-way complementarity as one possible micro-
foundation for the demand-scope spillovers hypothesis.
Services as a fringe item in the firm’s scope of activities.
We could see bi-exporters as multi-product firms for which the good is the firm’s core
competence and the service a peripheral product. In Eckel and Neary (2010) for exam-
ple, the decisions of a firm are interconnected across the products in its portfolio, again,
35We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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through a cannibalization effect. This is a model that could capture, for instance, a firm
selling a printer and also renting it. Everything else being equal, however, selling two
substitutable items implies lower sales for each item compared to the case where only
one is sold. These types of models are thus unable to replicate the positive association
between goods and services we find with our difference-in-difference setting in the data.
Add-on pricing
In our model of one-way complementarity, the service is very much like an option or an
add-on. The literature on the pricing of add-ons (see for instance Gabaix and Laibson,
2006; Ellison, 2005) is based on the assumption that consumers do not know the prices
of these options when deciding to buy the essential good. While this theory is appealing,
it mainly offers predictions on the prices of add-ons - which we do not observe in our
data - but no clear predictions on the price of the essential good. Moreover, while our
model is very stylized, we are able to replicate our empirical results without assuming
myopic consumers.
Heterogeneous consumers and market segmentation.
In our model, aggregate demand is obtained by assuming that all consumers are identical
and have CES preferences. The same demand system can be obtained assuming that
a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers decide first to allocate αkId to each good k
and then decide which variety to buy according to their idiosyncratic taste. Their
second-stage indirect utility for variety fkd is then:
Vfkd = logαk + log Id − log pfkd + εfkd
when consumed alone or:
Vbfkd = logαk + log Id − log
󰀅
pfkd + p
s
fkd
󰀆
+ εbfkd
when bundled with a service. Under the assumption that
󰀃
εfkd, ε
b
fkd
󰀄
are drawn identi-
cally and independently from a Gumbel distribution with standard deviation π√
6(σk−1) ,
aggregating consumers’ demand for their preferred variety leads back to the CES pref-
erences considered in the baseline model (for further discussions, see also Thisse and
Ushchev, 2018).
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In this setting, supplying the good-service bundle allows firms to segment the market
for product k between high and low-valuation consumers, and thus to extract more sur-
plus overall. Interestingly enough, the presence of high-valuation consumers decreases
the surplus of low-valuation consumers. We leave the distributional implications of
services trade liberalization for future research.
Empirics: Tracking services’ flows and external service suppliers.
On the empirical front, one might worry that services could sometimes be directly
charged with the good. We think that this should not be too often the case since
generally the provision of services (warranties, maintenance, assistance, consultancy
etc.) are the object of a separate transaction or a separate line in the contract so
that they must be declared by firms separately. However, should it be the case, this
means that we might identify among “normal” goods exporters firms that are in reality
bi-exporters, which should drive to zero the price, sales and quantity effects.
Another related issue is that services might sometimes be provided by external
suppliers directly in the destination country. From a purely empirical perspective, this
means that we might consider as “standard” goods flows some flows that in reality
are also bundled with services. Again, if anything, this biases our estimations of the
effect of services provision towards zero. The fact that we do find an effect suggests
that either the presence of external suppliers is negligible, or that the complementarity
is not the same if the service is provided by an external supplier. This is why we do
not model “pure” services suppliers in our theory. In such a framework, their presence
would provide consumers with the further option of purchasing the service from external
suppliers. This would increase the price of the good supplied alone and delete any
difference between bi-exporting and normal exporting. While interesting, this case
does not seem to hold in our empirical results, and in the absence of information on
local services suppliers, the data does not allow us to further analyze this case.
Overall, we thus believe that the demand complementarities between manufacturing
and services activities we model provide an appealing rationale for the perceived quality-
enhancing effect of services on goods we highlighted empirically.
6 Conclusion
While the servitization of our economies is often seen as going hand in hand with
deindustrialization, our work provides a different perspective on these two phenomena.
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By documenting that the very best exporters provide both goods and services, we
show that both activities are not necessarily antagonistic. Moreover, by means of an
instrumental variable strategy, we argue that the provision of services might actually
boost the demand for goods, allowing firms to charge higher prices without harming
the demand for their goods. This can be rationalized in a model with oligopolistic
competition where services are one-way complements to goods and consumers love
variety. By attracting a larger share of the market, firms that export services together
with their goods can increase their markups. Services act as a demand-shifter for
goods, and thus as a vector of perceived vertical differentiation; therefore, services are a
determinant of firm-level differences in goods export performance. Finally, our results
suggest that the liberalization of trade in services, which is at stake in many bilateral
negotiations such as those between the EU and the US for the TTIP or those with the
UK for Brexit, might have also important consequences for trade in goods in general
and for the biggest firms that are bi-exporters in particular. This is especially true for
services that are highly “bundleable” with goods such as business or computer services.
Considering goods and services separately in the negotiation of trade agreements is thus
likely to miss part of the business and welfare gains and losses related to these treaties.
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Appendix
A Descriptive Statistics
Table A-1: Bi-exporting sales premium - Identification on switchers
(1)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt
1 Servfdt 0.067
a
(0.014)
Log # Productsfdt 0.466
a
(0.007)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.322
a
(0.006)
1 AFFfdt 0.113
a
(0.021)
1 PARfdt 0.023
(0.035)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Destination FE Yes
Observations 1,634,212
R-squared 0.896
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses.
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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Table A-2: Bi-exporting sales premia by service type
(1)
Dep. Var. log Expfkdt
1 Transport 0.106a
(0.040)
1 Travel 0.094
(0.064)
1 Communication -0.101
(0.062)
1 Construction -0.031
(0.058)
1 Insurance 0.010
(0.080)
1 Financial 0.306a
(0.041)
1 Computer 0.118b
(0.052)
1 Royaties -0.032
(0.045)
1 Business 0.219a
(0.028)
1 Personal and Cultural 0.393a
(0.107)
1 Government 0.235
(0.249)
Log # Productsfdt 0.707
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.963
a
(0.005)
1 AFFft 0.301
a
(0.023)
1 PARft 0.190
a
(0.032)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,652,189
R-squared 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year
level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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Table A-3: Bi-exporting sales premium - Core product
(1)
Dep. Var. log Expfkdt
1 Servfdt 0.145
a
(0.023)
1 Servfdt* 1 Core productft 0.878
a
(0.030)
Log # Productsfdt 0.705
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.961
a
(0.005)
1 AFFft 0.297
a
(0.023)
1 PARft 0.205
a
(0.032)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,652,189
R-squared 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year
level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table A-4: Bi-exporting sales premium with even reporting thresholds for goods and
services export flows
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt
(1) (2)
1 Servfdt 0.352
a 0.226a
(0.016) (0.017)
Log # Productsfdt -0.122
a 0.476a
(0.003) (0.005)
Log Turnover/Lft 0.161
a
(0.004)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.587
a 0.510a
(0.004) (0.005)
1 MNEft 0.438
a
(0.007)
1 AFFfdt 0.227
a 0.284a
(0.016) (0.018)
1 PARfdt 0.222
a 0.244a
(0.023) (0.021)
1 Service Industryft -0.426
a
(0.0111)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE No Yes
Observations 667,165 519,658
R-squared 0.431 0.739
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year
level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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B Further Tables IV
We present in Table B-1 the results of the first step of our identification strategy. More
productive, multinational and service industry firms are more likely to export services
in the destinations where they already export goods.36 Services provision is also more
likely in destinations where multinational firms have foreign affiliates or parent firms.
Finally, our results show that the higher the number of exported products and the
more experienced a firm in a given market, the more likely it is to be a bi-exporter
in that destination.37 Regarding our excluded variables, as expected, we observe that
BIft is positively correlated with the likelihood of bi-exporting. This means that firms
with a product portfolio composed of goods that are more likely to be associated with
services have a higher probability of being bi-exporters. The sign of the coefficient on
the interaction term cannot be interpreted due to the non-linearity of the probit model.
We checked however that in a linear probability specification, the coefficient is positive
and significant, suggesting that on average, the effect of the BIft index is magnified in
markets where trade barriers are low or the demand for services is high.
36Note that in the second stage these variables will be absorbed by the fixed effect κfkt. For
computational reasons, we cannot include firm-year fixed effects in the probit.
37For market experience, we use here the maximum of years of presence observed across all products
exported by firm f in destination d at time t.
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Table B-1: Determinants of the probability of bi-exporting
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. 1 Servfdt
BIft 10.340
a 19.191a 13.853a
(0.820) (1.976) (0.644)
BIft× SRId 0.058c
(0.030)
BIft× SIdt -0.643a
(0.175)
BIft× IMPSHdt -5.001a
(1.368)
Log # Productsfdt 0.149
a 0.145a 0.145a
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Turnover/Lft 0.071
a 0.071a 0.070a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.043
a 0.042a 0.041a
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
1 MNEft 0.425
a 0.428a 0.429a
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
1 AFFfdt 0.220
a 0.245a 0.242a
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
1 PARfdt 0.256
a 0.258a 0.256a
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
1 Service industry dummyft 0.574
a 0.612a 0.610a
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 417,751 503,728 499,385
Note: Probit model. BIft is the “bundleability” index of the firm-level prod-
uct portfolio with services, SRId is an OECD measure of barriers to services
trade imposed by the destination country, SIdt stands for destination-level im-
ports of services (excluding Belgium from the source countries), IMPSHdt is the
share of services in overall imports of the destination country. Standard errors
clustered at the destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c
p<0.1.
Table B-2: IV results - Alternative instrument I
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.763
a 0.289b 0.474a
(0.157) (0.142) (0.057)
Log # Productsfdt 0.643
a 0.678a -0.035a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.992
a 1.002a -0.010a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.283
a 0.337a -0.054a
(0.024) (0.021) (0.010)
PARft 0.177
a 0.220a -0.043a
(0.032) (0.030) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,570,818 1,570,818 1,570,818
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 118.9 118.9 118.9
Note:Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1. SIdt, i.e. the imports of services (excluding Belgium), used as a (inverse) proxy
for barriers to services trade in the destination country in the first-stage probit.
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Table B-3: IV results - Alternative instrument II
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.749
a 0.276c 0.474a
(0.161) (0.146) (0.058)
Log # Productsfdt 0.645
a 0.681a -0.035a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.990
a 1.001a -0.011a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.286
a 0.341a -0.055a
(0.024) (0.020) (0.010)
PARft 0.177
a 0.220a -0.043a
(0.032) (0.031) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,587,271 1,587,271 1,587,271
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 111.9 111.9 111.9
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1. IMPSHdt, i.e. the share of services in overall imports of the destination
country, used as a (inverse) proxy for barriers to services trade in the destination country in the
first-stage probit.
Table B-4: Second-stage results - Services share in firm-level exports <50%
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.836
a 0.326b 0.510a
(0.166) (0.149) (0.060)
Log # Productsfdt 0.655
a 0.693a -0.038a
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.012
a 1.022a -0.010a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.253
a 0.302a -0.049a
(0.026) (0.022) (0.011)
PARft 0.220
a 0.257a -0.038a
(0.035) (0.033) (0.012)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,324,194 1,324,194 1,324,194
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 110.3 110.3 110.3
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
50
Table B-5: IV results - Excluding destinations with parents or affiliates
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.908
a 0.253 0.655a
(0.220) (0.202) (0.085)
Log # Productsfdt 0.647
a 0.690a -0.042a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.007
a 1.015a -0.008a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,155,463 1,155,463 1,155,463
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 76.52 76.52 76.52
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table B-6: IV results - Servfdt coded one only for complementary services
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.860
a 0.279c 0.581a
(0.182) (0.162) (0.069)
Log # Productsfdt 0.653
a 0.693a -0.040a
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.011
a 1.020a -0.009a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.267
a 0.307a -0.040a
(0.027) (0.022) (0.011)
PARft 0.197
a 0.248a -0.051a
(0.035) (0.033) (0.013)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,338,656 1,338,656 1,338,656
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 99.23 99.23 99.23
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table B-7: IV results - no windsorization
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.775
a 0.254c 0.498a
(0.160) (0.143) (0.058)
Log # Productsfdt 0.656
a 0.692a -0.039a
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.011
a 1.021a -0.010a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.252
a 0.303a -0.051a
(0.026) (0.022) (0.011)
PARft 0.215
a 0.254a -0.038a
(0.035) (0.032) (0.012)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,375,683 1,342,945 1,342,945
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 116.1 119.5 119.5
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table B-8: IV results - even reporting thresholds for goods and services export flows
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.266
c 0.171 0.095c
(0.143) (0.152) (0.052)
Log # Productsfdt 0.433
a 0.460a -0.027a
(0.016) (0.017) (0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.494
a 0.527a -0.033a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003)
AFFft 0.263
a 0.306a -0.042a
(0.018) (0.020) (0.007)
PARft 0.286
a 0.317a -0.031a
(0.025) (0.027) (0.010)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 378,983 378,983 378,983
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat 181.3 181.3 181.3
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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